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Abstract 
An Early Warning System potentially allows mitigation measures to be carried out from the 
moment in which a seismic event is detected. Examples of such measures are evacuation of 
buildings, shut-down of critical systems (nuclear reactors, industrial chemical processes, etc.) and 
stopping of high-speed trains. The type of mitigation measures that can be effectively activated 
depends on the amount of warning time available, but timeliness is often in conflict with the 
reliability of the predictions, which become more accurate as more seismic sensor data is collected. 
There is therefore an inevitable trade-off between the amount of warning time available and the 
reliability of the predictions provided by the Early Warning System. To investigate this trade-off, 
the consequences of the two alternatives of taking mitigation actions or not acting must be analyzed, 
accounting for significant uncertainty in the predictions.  
In this report, we present a decision-making procedure based on the real-time evaluation of 
the consequences of taking no action and of activating mitigation measures which is based on the 
probabilities of false and missed alerts. The threshold at which mitigating actions should be taken is 
quantified based on a cost-benefit analysis. The method is applied to two recent seismic events in 
Southern California, an M 4.75 event in Yorba Linda and an M 6.5 event in San Simeon. Also, a 
feasibility assessment of any proposed regional Early Warning System is of critical importance, and 
it should involve an examination of whether the requirements, in terms of warning time available 
and the probability of making wrong decisions, are met. A useful tool in this assessment of an Early 
Warning System is a seismic hazard map to provide the probability of exceedance of ground 
shaking intensity, given a site and time interval of interest, and a corresponding map of the 
probability of making a wrong decision.  In this report, a methodology is presented for estimating 
the probabilities of making wrong decisions that can be incorporated in a feasibility assessment of 
proposed Early Warning System.  
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 1. Introduction 
The high social and economic vulnerability of urbanized areas to seismic risk has become 
evident in recent years due to severe losses as a consequence of catastrophic earthquakes. The 
extent of structural damage and economic loss due to these catastrophic events underlines the strong 
necessity of social, political and scientific cooperation for disaster prevention.  
It is clear that timely warnings can mitigate the effects of natural disasters. Such warnings 
are commonly given for floods, hurricanes, tornados and tsunamis, but still under development for 
earthquakes.  Effective early warning technologies for earthquakes are much more challenging to 
develop because warning times range from only a few seconds to a minute or so (Allen and 
Kanamori, 2003). In areas close to faults, where seismic early warning systems (EWS) represent a 
mandatory necessity, only tens of seconds of warning are available. Such short warning times mean 
that to be effective a seismic EWS must depend on automated procedures, including those for 
decision making about whether to activate mitigation measures; the time is too short to require 
human intervention when the event is first detected. As a result of the automation, careful attention 
must be paid to the design of the local seismic EWS for each critical facility; in particular, a means 
of controlling the trade-off between false alarms and missed alarms is desirable.  
Of course, as an essential part of a seismic EWS, an infrastructure must be in place that 
consists of a seismic sensor network with high-speed communication to some data-processing 
center, along with a broadcasting system to disseminate the early warning information to the local 
automated system that can activate the mitigation measures designed for a specific facility. 
Historical lessons come of some help to appreciate the EWS potentialities. In the Indian 
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Ocean tsunami disaster of 26 December 2004, a tsunami EWS was in place for the Pacific Ocean 
that detected the large Sumatran subduction zone event but there was an inadequate broadcasting 
system to disseminate the early warning information to the countries at risk surrounding the Indian 
Ocean. Many thousands of lives could have been saved if a preventive alarm had been broadcasted 
to warn people in the coastal regions about the tsunami. In this case, for those locations sufficiently 
far from the ruptured segment of the Sumatran subduction zone, warning times of several hours 
were possible, so that before the tsunami arrived, many people might have been able to escape from 
the low-lying coastal areas to higher elevations. This mitigation action would have been enhanced 
by the availability of predicted inundation and damage maps to direct people to safer locations.  
Although early warning technologies have been developed to provide natural hazard 
mitigation for many types of hazards, attention here is focused on seismic risk mitigation because 
the technologies for this application are not yet fully developed. 
1.1. Potential benefits of seismic Early Warning Systems 
The main goal of an EWS for earthquakes is the reduction or prevention of loss of life and 
mitigation of structural damage and economic loss. The benefits of EWS are due to the measures 
that can be carried out from the moment in which a seismic event is detected at a certain place until 
the moment in which the seismic waves arrive at a location of interest. These measures, for 
prevention or emergency response, can be categorized by considering the phases of the seismic 
event (Wieland, 2001).  
After event detection but before the earthquake arrives at a site, the warning provided by 
EWS with pre-arrival times of up to perhaps 90 seconds, could be used to evacuate buildings, shut-
down critical systems (such as nuclear and chemical reactors), put vulnerable machines and 
industrial robots into a safe position, stop high-speed trains, activate structural control systems 
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(Kanda et al. 1994, Occhiuzzi et al. 2004), and so on.  
During an earthquake, the alarm generated by EWS could still enable such mitigation 
processes to be activated if there was insufficient time to do so prior to the arrival of the earthquake 
at the site. Within seconds after an earthquake, the information provided by EWS could be used to 
produce damage and loss maps based on the ground shaking intensity and could be the basis for 
more effective emergency response and rescue operations.  
Evacuation of at-risk buildings and facilities is only feasible if the warning time is around 1 
minute before the arrival of the strong shaking, which is possible only in the case where the seismic 
source zone is sufficiently far away. This is the situation, for example, for the threat to Mexico City 
from earthquakes occurring in the subduction zone along the Pacific Coast (e.g. Lee and Espinosa-
Aranda, 1998), where the time available is sufficient to alert large segments of the population by 
commercial radio and television, and for evacuation of strategic buildings, such as schools, crowded 
facilities, and so on.  
In the case of a few seconds warning time before the shaking, it is still possible to slow 
down trains (e.g. Saita and Nakamura, 1998), to switch traffic lights to red (as for the Lions Gate 
bridge EWS, Vancouver), to close valves in gas and oil pipelines, to release control rods in nuclear 
power plants (e.g. Wieland et al., 2000), activate structural control systems, and so on. In addition, 
secondary hazards can be mitigated that are triggered by earthquakes but which take more time to 
develop, such as landslides, tsunamis, fires, etc., by predicting the ground motion parameters for the 
incoming seismic waves. This could be used, for example, to initiate the evacuation of endangered 
areas. 
Given that an appropriate EWS is in place for a local area or critical facility, its impact or 
effectiveness is dependent on the warning time available and the quality and reliability of the 
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information that is provided, since these influence and constrain the utilization of the information. 
In most EWS applications, the available warning time is likely to be no more than tens of seconds, 
enabling the possibility of activating mitigation measures but meaning that automated activation is 
essential to fully utilize the available warning time. 
1.2. Limitations of effectiveness of seismic Early Warning Systems  
The benefits of an EWS for earthquakes are often not fulfilled due to limitations that depend 
on: 
1. the amount of warning time  
2. the probability of making wrong decisions (false alarms and missed alarms) 
These parameters strongly influence EWS impact and effectiveness on seismic risk 
reduction. Each of these is discussed in turn. 
To examine the available warning time for activation of seismic mitigation measures, the 
main principle on which an EWS is based is first described. This principle is that seismic waves 
travel through the Earth with a velocity that is much less than the velocity of the electromagnetic 
signals transmitted by telephone or radio to provide seismic information about the incoming event. 
In addition, seismic body waves can be identified as compression waves (primary waves or P-
waves) and shear waves (secondary waves or S-waves) (Occhiuzzi et al., 2004), where the P-waves 
are characterized by a propagation velocity that is almost twice that of S-waves; the latter are 
stronger and give almost horizontal ground motion at the base of a structure, in contrast to P-waves, 
so S-waves tend to be more damaging. The time interval from the detection of P-waves in the 
epicentral area, and the arrival of S-waves in the area where the structure or facility is located, may 
be utilized to activate mitigation measures. The feasible warning time is given by: 
Tw=Ts-Tr             (1) 
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Tr=Td+Tpr             (2) 
where the origin of time is the P-wave detection time; Tr is the reporting time comprised of the time 
Td needed by the system to trigger and record a sufficient length of waveforms and the time Tpr to 
process the data; Ts is the S-wave travel time and Tw is the early warning time. For the warning time 
to be considered adequate for the activation of a mitigation measure, it has to be greater than the 
time necessary for activation of the measure. 
Suppose that the EWS works by setting an alarm if a critical shaking intensity threshold is 
predicted to be exceeded at a site, where the choice of critical threshold depends on the 
vulnerability of the system to be protected at the site. Assuming that the warning time provided by 
the EWS is sufficient for activation of the mitigation measure, then based on the predictions from 
the first few seconds of P-wave observation, a decision has to be made of whether to activate the 
alarm or not. In making this decision, two kinds of errors may be committed (Wald, 1947): 
Type I error: the alarm is not activated when it should have been. 
Type II error: the alarm is activated when it should not have been. 
We call Type I errors missed alarms and type II errors false alarms. The probability of each of these 
wrong decisions is denoted by: 
Pma= probability of missed alarm, that is, the probability of having critical threshold 
exceedance but no alarm activation. 
Pfa = probability of false alarm, that is, the probability of having no threshold exceedance 
but alarm activation. 
The tolerance of a type I or II error is related to a trade-off between the benefits of a correct 
decision and the costs of a wrong decision and it could vary substantially, depending on the relative 
consequences of possible missed and false alarms. For example, the automated opening of a fire 
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station door has minimal impact if the door is opened for a false alarm. On the contrary, an 
automated shutdown of a power plant because of a false alarm could cause problems over an entire 
city and involve expensive procedures to restore to full-operational status. In this latter case, the 
EWS must be designed to keep the frequency of false alarms very low. In general, the automated 
decision process has to be designed with attention focused on the probability of false and missed 
alarms along with a cost-benefit analysis. Some mitigation measures could be unacceptable to 
operate as a result of the false or missed alarm rate being too high. 
The probability of a wrong decision is due to having only partial knowledge of the 
phenomenon and so any prediction, as a consequence, is affected by uncertainty. A key element of 
an EWS is a better understanding of the parameters that play a fundamental role in this uncertainty, 
and hence a better understanding of the quality of the predictions on which decision making is 
based. 
2. Ground motion prediction process in seismic EWS 
2.1. Basic idea of EWS operation 
The EWS is composed of a network of seismic stations, a dedicated real-time data 
communication system, central processing system, broadcasting system and information receivers at 
the user’s end. In some cases, this network may be a dedicated local one placed at some distance 
around a structure to provide data about incoming seismic waves. When a seismic event occurs, the 
stations close to the epicentral area are triggered by P-waves, then the ground motion data is 
recorded and sent by the communication system to the central processor, where, based on predictive 
models, an evaluation is made in real-time to predict the earthquake source parameters of the event. 
This information is provided to the user by a distribution network, and based on this early 
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information, the user predicts a ground motion or structural performance parameter of interest for a 
facility. This parameter represents the predictor on which the decision whether to raise the alarm or 
not is based. In this report, the predictor is taken to be an intensity measure IM, which is a ground 
motion parameter that represents the shaking intensity at the site of the facility. Two common 
intensity measures are peak ground acceleration (PGA) and response spectral acceleration (Sa). The 
IM is to be predicted based on the first few seconds of data registered by some of the seismic 
stations in a regional network that are near the earthquake source. The parameter of interest for a 
facility could also be taken as some critical engineering demand parameter, such as inter-story drift 
in a building or floor acceleration at the location of vulnerable equipment, or even economic loss. 
The prediction model for the ground motion parameters can be represented as a sequential 
multi-compartment model (Bates et al., 2003), composed of two sub-models, M1 and M2 (Grasso et 
al., 2005), as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
M1I M2M, R IM  
Figure 1. The multi-component model representing EWS. 
M1 is the earthquake prediction model and M2 is the ground motion attenuation model 
 
The earthquake prediction model, M1, estimates earthquake source parameters (magnitude, 
M; epicentral distance, R), based on parameters, I, extracted from real-time measurements of the 
first few seconds of P-waves, e.g., I is the predominant period in Allen and Kanamori (2003); while 
I is the observed ground motion ratio for the Virtual Seismologist method in Cua and Heaton 
(2004).   
The ground motion attenuation model, M2, predicts ground motion parameters (intensity 
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measures IM), based on the magnitude and epicentral distance predicted by M1. The parameter IM, 
which could be the final outcome of the EWS prediction process, represents the predicted ground 
motion intensity (e.g. PGA, PGV or Sa) that will occur at the site where a strategic facility of 
interest is located. It is assumed in this work that IM is the predictor on which the decision to take 
some protective action is based.   
2.2. Sources of uncertainty 
Uncertainty in the predictor IM is a result of the uncertain prediction errors produced by the 
models M1 and M2. The uncertainties for each model are represented in Figure 2, where εM, εR and 
εIM denote the prediction errors for the magnitude and location and the attenuation model, 
respectively. Uncertainties of each sub-model propagate through the output, so each uncertainty 
plays an important role in the definition of the final quality of the intensity measure, IM. 
 
M1I M2M, R IM
εM, εR εIM
 
Figure 2. The multi-component model for EWS uncertainty propagation. 
 
A Gaussian probability distribution model is chosen for εM and εIM to model the magnitude 
and attenuation model uncertainties. The uncertainty in the predicted magnitude can be well 
modeled as a Gaussian distribution, as shown by Cua and Heaton (2004), with standard deviation 
dependent on the prediction model. The magnitude error has zero-mean and a standard deviation of 
about 0.4 magnitude units for the Heaton-Cua relation and it decreases with increasing number of 
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data. According to the Allen-Kanamori method, the uncertainty of magnitude prediction is related 
to the number of stations considered and to the elapsed time, and it assumes a value of 0.7 
magnitude units considering only one station, 0.6 for three stations, 0.45 for five stations, and it 
drops to 0.35 if ten stations are considered (Allen 2003). The errors related to the ground motion 
parameter conditional on M and R being given are modeled well by a lognormal distribution, so if 
the intensity measure IM is the logarithm of the ground motion parameter, then IM can be assumed 
to be Gaussian. This assumption is supported by the analysis done by Cua and Heaton (2004) in 
which the errors were analyzed based on a large number of data from ground motions recorded by 
the seismic network in Southern California over 4 years.  
In this work, the uncertainty log Rε  in the natural logarithm loge R  of the epicentral distance 
prediction is modeled as Gaussian, which means that R has a lognormal distribution. It also means 
that for small prediction errors, logˆR R Rε ε≈  is approximately Gaussian. It has been suggested that a 
more complex distribution for εR might be appropriate based on the observation that in the case of 
large-magnitude teleseismic events, the probability of a large prediction error based on the first few 
seconds of data is likely; in fact, in this case, the network could erroneously locate the epicenter 
inside the instrumented area (Kanamori and Heaton 2004, personal communication).  
2.3. Uncertainty propagation 
The quality of the predictions for the ground motion parameter of interest is fundamental for 
optimization of the decision-making process. This quality is influenced by the errors of the sub-
models that propagate through to the output and influence the effectiveness of the EWS application. 
In particular, it is necessary to estimate the total prediction error in order to quantify the 
performance of the EWS prediction process in terms of the probability of false and missed alarms. 
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For this purpose, all the prediction errors influencing the intensity measure have to be considered, 
as shown in Figure 2, along with their corresponding probability distributions.  
The total prediction error is given by comparing the predicted intensity measure, ˆ ,IM  to the 
actual IM: 
ˆ
tot IM IMε = −            (3) 
where MI ˆ  is a function of the predicted values ˆ and ˆM R , which can be expressed in terms of the 
actual  and M R  and the uncertain prediction errors εM and εlogR:  
log
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , log ) ( , log )e M eIM f M R f M Rε ε= = − − R
e
       (4) 
where the function  f represents the ground motion attenuation model as follows: 
( , log ) logef M R M Rα β γ= + +           (5) 
Most published attenuation models have this form if IM denotes loge PGA or loge Sa (Seismological 
Research Letters, 1997); in the examples later, IM is taken to be loge PGA. The actual intensity 
measure, IM, is represented by:  
( , log )eIM f M R IMε= +            (6) 
where εΙM is the prediction error in the ground motion attenuation model, given M and R.   
Under previous assumptions about εM, log Rε  and εΙM, the total prediction error totε  also 
follows a Gaussian distribution with a mean and variance that depends on the means and variances 
of these contributing prediction errors, since: 
log
log
ˆ ( , log ) ( , log )
     
     ˆ
tot e IM M e R
M R IM
M R IM
IM IM f M R f M R
R
ε ε ε
βε γε ε
γβε ε ε
= − = + − − −
= + +
≈ + +
ε
     (7) 
Under the assumption of independence of errors, the variance of totε  is: 
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2 2 2 2 2
log
2
2 2 2 2
2
     ˆ
tot M R IM
M R IR M
σ β σ γ σ σ
γβ σ σ σ
= + +
≈ + +         (8) 
and the mean of totε  is equal to: 
logtot M R IMµ βµ γµ µ= + +          (9) 
If the empirically-derived models M1 and M2 (Figures 1 and 2) are unbiased, then the mean 
0totµ = . In fact, totµ does have a value close to zero in the Virtual Seismologist method (Cua and 
Heaton 2004). If more complex attenuation models, or more complex probability models for εM, 
log Rε  and εΙM, are used, this analytical approach may be not applicable and then a Monte Carlo 
method is suggested to quantify the uncertainty in totε  (see Appendix).  
3. Probability of wrong decisions: pre-installation analysis 
3.1. Probabilities of false and missed alarms: pre-installation analysis 
When examining the feasibility of installing an EWS for a facility, it is important to have a 
mechanism to control the probabilities of false and missed alarms. Since the decision to activate the 
alarm is based on a predictor, ˆ ,IM  false alarms can be caused by the predictor exceeding the 
warning threshold even though the actual intensity measure, IM, that occurs at the site does not 
reach the critical value. Similarly, missed alarms can be caused by the predictor not exceeding the 
warning threshold even though the actual intensity measure reaches its critical value. 
For a given facility, the critical threshold, a, of IM must be chosen by the user based on a 
vulnerability analysis of the system to be protected; for example, it could be chosen as the value of 
IM for which there is a high probability that damage (or significant economic losses) will occur. To 
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control the probability of wrong decisions, the warning threshold is chosen as the product of the 
critical threshold a and a parameter, c, to be specified during the design process. The critical 
threshold depends on the facility, structure or equipment to be protected, but the warning threshold 
 depends on the design process chosen to optimize the automated alarm activation system. The 
design parameter c provides a mechanism to control the incidence of false and missed alarms. It is 
not possible to simultaneously reduce both of these but the design parameter c can be used to 
control the trade-off between them.  
c a⋅
A false alarm occurs when the EWS predicts a value, ˆ ,IM  that exceeds the warning 
threshold, , while the actual value, IM, of the intensity measure at the site turns out to be less 
than the value of the critical threshold, a. For a pre-installation analysis, the probability of a false 
alarm is therefore given by: 
ac ⋅
]ˆ|P[ acMIaIMPfa ⋅>≤=          (10) 
Similarly, the probability of a missed alarm is given by: 
]ˆ|P[ acMIaIMPma ⋅≤>=          (11) 
The values of the probabilities of false and missed alarms, Pfa and Pma, are an important tool for the 
decision-making process during pre-installation design and during operation in a seismic event.  
During design, the anticipated rate of missed and false alarms represents a guideline for 
EWS feasibility. The realization of EWS could be feasible or not, depending on whether the 
requirements in terms of warning time available and the probability of wrong decisions can be met. 
A useful tool to evaluate an EWS may be constructed by using a seismic hazard map to provide the 
probability of exceedance of ground shaking intensity, given a site and time interval of interest, to 
produce a map of probability of wrong decisions. Such a map would help when performing a 
territorial feasibility assessment of EWS applications.  
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During a seismic event, the (automated) decision to activate protective measures may be 
done either by comparing the requirements in terms of warning time needed and the tolerable level 
of  (or ) based on the information made available by the EWS, or by monitoring a time-
varying threshold . This case is examined later in Section 5. 
faP maP
( )c t a⋅
The main reason for evaluating the probability of wrong decisions using a pre-installation 
analysis is to design the warning threshold, which can be chosen based on the probabilities of false 
and missed alarms and their expected annual frequency that are tolerable to the owner or manager 
of the facility to be protected. By estimating the probability of false and missed alarms during 
design of the EWS application, we are primarily trying to answer to the question: How would an 
EWS perform during earthquakes that might occur in the area of interest, in terms of a false and 
missed alarm rates? 
The probabilities of false and missed alarms in a pre-installation analysis are evaluated as a 
time-independent variable based on the seismicity of the area of interest. Time dependence can be 
neglected as a first approximation. A more refined analysis is presented later in Section 5 for the 
operation of an EWS application during a seismic event, where the changes in estimated magnitude 
and location coming from the EWS are taken into account. In any case, the prediction uncertainty 
stabilizes after some time following the first triggering. In some special cases, such as Mexico City, 
the location of the fault area and the configuration of the seismic stations lead to stabilization of the 
uncertainty of the prediction after the first few seconds.  
3.2. Prior information: hazard function 
Prior information can be expressed by using the hazard (rate) function (Kramer 1996) that 
gives the mean annual rate of events with intensity measure exceeding a certain critical value, given 
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a site of interest. The hazard function for a site comes from a PSHA (probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis). It directly provides information related to the expected frequency of occurrence of the 
intensity measure IM for a given site and time period of interest; on the other hand, the EWS gives 
the predicted intensity measure, ˆ ,IM  that differs from the actual IM by the prediction error, εtot. 
This error depends on the errors related to the prediction of magnitude, M, and epicentral distance, 
R, and the prediction error of the ground motion attenuation model. Figure 3 shows the relation 
between IM and ˆIM  given by εtot, which depends on εM, εR and εIM as in Eq. 7.  
The goal of the analysis that follows is to describe the EWS behavior in terms of the 
probabilities of having false and missed alarms, based on a given seismic hazard environment 
represented by the intensity measure hazard function, ( ).IMλ  Considering all the possible events, 
the probability of a wrong decision is determined for a given site and a given period of time (e.g. 
one year). The key to forecasting the behaviour of the EWS is the prior knowledge about the errors 
that are committed when predicting the intensity measure. This prior knowledge comes from an 
analysis of the uncertainty propagation of the errors, as described in Section 2.  
Attenuation 
Model
M
IM
R
Attenuation 
Model
Mˆ
MI ˆ
Rˆ
εR
εM
εIM
εtot
 
Figure 3. Simulation of the EWS process of prediction in a pre-installation analysis. 
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The hazard function defines the mean annual rate of exceedance of a critical value of the 
ground motion intensity measure; from this mean rate, the probability of exceedance of a critical 
value, given that an earthquake of interest has occurred, can be determined as follows, which is 
based on a Poisson process model for the temporal occurrence of earthquakes: 
]|[)()( 00 IMIMIMIMPIMIM cc >>⋅= λλ        (12) 
where IM 0 is the minimum value of the intensity measure that is of interest (cut-off value) and it is 
used to define the earthquakes of interest.  
An exponential model is assumed for the hazard function for a site (but recall that the choice 
of IM used in the examples is loge PGA so this corresponds to a power law on PGA): 
1
0( ) 10
k IMIM kλ −=            (13) 
where k0 and k1 can be obtained by fitting the hazard function from a PSHA for the site. This model 
implies from Eq. 12 that: 
[ ] 1 (0| 10 ck IM IMcP IM IM IM IM − −> > = 0 )        (14) 
The cumulative distribution function is then: 
 [ ] 1 (0| 1 10 ck IM IMcP IM IM IM IM − −≤ > = − 0 )        (15) 
and the expression for the PDF (probability density function) is derived by differentiating this 
cumulative distribution function: 
( ) 1 0 1( )0 1| log 10 10 10k IM IM k IMep IM IM IM k c− − −> = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅      (16) 
where  1 01 log 10 10
k IM
ec k= ⋅ ⋅ .  
In this work, the parameter k1 is estimated from a hazard function for the site of interest by 
using a minimum entropy criterion in which the relative entropy E is minimized with respect to k1: 
log ii
i i
pE p
q
⎛ ⎞= ⎜⎝ ⎠∑ ⎟           (17) 
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where pi represents the discrete probability distribution function derived from ( )0|p IM IM IM>  
and qi is the discrete probability distribution function derived from the given hazard function 
( )IMλ  using Eq. 12, so qi is obtained by numerically differentiating the cumulative distribution 
function in the same way as ( 0| )p IM IM IM>  was derived above. Therefore, pi is a function of 
the parameter k1 but qi is not. By minimizing the relative entropy, we determine the parameter k1 so 
that the model PDF is the best fit in an information-theoretic sense to the PDF implied by the hazard 
function for the site. 
3.3. Probability of false alarm: pre-installation analysis 
The probability of false alarms, as defined in Eq. 10, can be expressed using Bayes rule as: 
0
0
0
ˆ| ,
ˆ |
     
ˆ |
faP P IM a IM c a IM IM
P IM a IM c a IM IM
P IM c a IM IM
⎡ ⎤= ≤ > ⋅ >⎣ ⎦
⎡ ≤ ∩ > ⋅ >⎣= ⎡ ⎤> ⋅ >⎣ ⎦
⎤⎦        (18) 
where it is assumed that an earthquake of interest, i.e. 0IM IM> , has occurred and that . 0a IM>
The numerator, let us call it Pfa,1, is evaluated as: 
0
,1 0
0
ˆ |
ˆ ˆ      ( , | )
fa
a
ca IM
P P IM a IM c a IM IM
p IM IM IM IM dIMdIM
∞
⎡ ⎤= ≤ ∩ > ⋅ >⎣ ⎦
= >∫ ∫        (19) 
which can be written, using Bayes rule, as: 
0
,1 0
ˆ( | ) ( | )
a
fa
IM ca
P p IM IM p IM IM IM dIMdIM
∞
= ⋅ >∫ ∫ ˆ
)
     (20) 
where ( 0|p IM IM IM>  is given by Eq. 16 and  is a Gaussian distribution with IM 
representing the mean value (if εtot has zero mean) and standard deviation σtot given by Eq. 8. In the 
case that the prediction, 
)|ˆ( IMMIp
ˆ ,IM  is affected by a significant bias error (i.e. mean µtot of εtot is not close 
 23  
to zero), then the mean of the Gaussian distribution  is (IM - µtot) (see Eq. 3). 
Substituting in Eq. 20: 
)|ˆ( IMMIp
1
0
,1
2
ˆ1
2
1 ˆexp 10
2
a
k IM
fa
IM ca tot
IM IM
tot
P σσ π
∞ ⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−−⎡ ⎤= ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ c dIMdIM      (21) 
The integral of the Gaussian distribution over ˆIM  can be expressed in terms of the standard 
Gaussian cumulative distribution function Φ: 
2
ˆ1
2
1 ˆexp
2ca tot
ca IMIM IM
tot tot
dIMσ σσ π
∞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−−−⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞= Φ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫ − ⎟       (22) 
so Eq. 21 can be cast in a simpler form:  
1
0
,1 10
a
k IM
fa
IM
ca IM
tot
P cσ
−−−⎛ ⎞= Φ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ dIM
ˆ
ˆ
       (23) 
The denominator of Pfa in Eq. 18 is expressed as: 
,2 0
ˆ( | )fa
ca
P p IM IM IM dIM
∞
= >∫         (24) 
which can be written, using the theorem of total probability, as: 
0
,2 0
ˆ( | ) ( | )fa
IM ca
P p IM IM p IM IM IM dIMdIM
∞ ∞
= ⋅ >∫ ∫      (25) 
This can be expressed in terms of the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function Φ as: 
1
0
,2 10
k IM
fa
IM
ca IM
tot
P cσ
∞
−−−⎛ ⎞= Φ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ dIM        (26) 
Summarizing, the probability of false alarm in a pre-installation analysis is given by: 
1
0
1
0
10
10
a
k IM
IM
fa
k IM
IM
ca IM
tot
ca IM
tot
dIM
P
dIM
σ
σ
−
∞
−
−−
−−
⎛ ⎞Φ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= ⎛ ⎞Φ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫
∫
        (27) 
The integrals in the denominator and numerator here can be evaluated numerically for different 
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values of c, given the value of a; then curves of Pfa versus c can be plotted for different critical 
thresholds a. Examples are given later in Section 6. 
 
3.4. Probability of missed alarm: pre-installation analysis 
The probability of missed alarms, as defined in Eq. 11, can be written using Bayes rule as: 
0
0
0
ˆ |ˆ| ,
ˆ |
ma
P IM a IM c a IM IM
P P IM a IM c a IM IM
P IM c a IM IM
⎡ ⎤> ∩ ≤ ⋅ >⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤= > ≤ ⋅ > =⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤≤ ⋅ >⎣ ⎦
  (28) 
where once again it is assumed that an earthquake of interest has occurred and that . The 
numerator can be expressed as: 
0a IM>
,1 0
0
ˆ |
ˆ ˆ       ( , | )
ma
ca
a
P P IM a IM c a IM IM
p IM IM IM IM dIMdIM
∞
−∞
⎡ ⎤= > ∩ ≤ ⋅ >⎣ ⎦
= >∫ ∫        (29) 
which can be written, using Bayes rule, as:  
,1 0
ˆ( | ) ( | )
ca
ma
a
P p IM IM p IM IM IM dIMdIM
∞
−∞
= ⋅ >∫ ∫ ˆ
)
      (30) 
where ( 0|p IM IM IM>  is given by Eq. 16 and  is a Gaussian distribution as before 
(see after Eq. 20). Substituting in Eq. 30: 
)|ˆ( IMMIp
1
,1
2
ˆ1
2
1 ˆexp 10
2
ca
k IM
ma
a tot
IM IM
tot
P σσ π
∞ ⎛ ⎞ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠−∞
−−⎡ ⎤= ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ c dIMdIM      (31) 
The integral of the Gaussian distribution over MI ˆ  can be expressed in terms of the standard 
Gaussian cumulative distribution function Φ:  
2
ˆ1
2
1 ˆexp  
2
ca
tot
ca IMIM IM
tot tot
dIMσ σσ π
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠−∞
−−−⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞= Φ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫ ⎟       (32) 
so Eq. 31 can be cast in a simpler form: 
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1
,1 10
k IM
ma
a
ca IM
tot
P cσ
∞
−−⎛ ⎞= Φ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ dIM
ˆ
ˆ
        (33) 
The denominator of Pma in Eq. 28 is: 
,2 0
ˆ( | )
ca
maP p IM IM IM dIM
−∞
= >∫         (34) 
which can be expressed, using the theorem of total probability, as: 
0
,2 0
ˆ( | ) ( | )
ca
ma
IM
P p IM IM p IM IM IM dIMdIM
∞
−∞
= ⋅ >∫ ∫      (35) 
This can be expressed in terms of the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function:  
1
0
,2 10
k IM
ma
IM
ca IM
tot
P cσ
∞
−−⎛ ⎞= Φ ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∫ dIM       (36) 
The probability of missed alarms in a pre-installation analysis is therefore given by:  
1
1
0
10
10
k IM
a
ma
k IM
IM
ca IM
tot
ca IM
tot
dIM
P
dIM
σ
σ
∞
−
∞
−
−
−
⎛ ⎞Φ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= ⎛ ⎞Φ ⋅⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫
∫
       (37) 
 26  
4. Threshold design and feasibility assessment 
4.1. Designing the test procedure: alarm threshold setting 
 A test procedure leading to the acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis is simply a rule 
specifying whenever the hypothesis should be accepted or rejected based on the observed data. A 
test procedure can be defined by subdividing the sample space of all possible values that the 
predictor can assume into two exclusive regions (Wald, 1947): 
− Region 1, for which acceptance of the hypothesis is preferred 
− Region 2 is the critical region, for which rejection of the hypothesis is preferred 
For EWS, the hypothesis of interest is the exceedance of the critical threshold of the 
intensity measure and Region 2 is represented by all the values of intensity measure for which the 
alarm should be activated and Region 1 where it should not to be activated. The critical region is 
defined by the critical threshold that is provided by the user, which could represent the likely 
occurrence of structural damage or heavy economic losses. On the other hand, the warning 
threshold corresponds to when the alarm should be raised. The warning threshold is defined by 
decision criteria based on the user’s requirements, which could involve selecting tolerable levels for 
the probabilities of wrong decisions or be based on cost-benefit considerations. Both of these cases 
for warning threshold design are described and are analysed in this section. In Section 4.2, the 
criterion is related to a tolerable level of making wrong decisions, and in Section 4.3, to a cost-
benefit analysis.  
4.2. Threshold setting based on tolerated risks of making the wrong decision  
In the case that the user’s requirements are given as the tolerable values of probabilities of 
false and missed alarms, the test procedure can be designed as follows. 
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The goal is to design a test that satisfies the conditions imposed on Pfa (or Pma) by 
controlling the alarm threshold c·a on ˆIM . If the probability of false alarms is lowered, then the 
probability of missed alarms is increased. To design the alarm threshold for IM, the trade-off 
between Pfa and Pma must be studied. Because of this trade-off, there is a limit as to how much the 
probabilities of wrong decisions can be reduced. This limit can be studied by using Stein’s lemma, 
which states:   
If a large number N of observations is available, then as Pma → 0, [ ]0 1exp  ( , )faP N K p→ − p  
where K is the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler distance): 
1
0 1 1
0
( , ) loge
pK p p p dIM
p
= ∫          (38) 
where p0 is the PDF of IM conditioned on ˆIM c a≤ ⋅  (null hypothesis) and p1 is the PDF of IM 
conditioned on ˆIM c a> ⋅ . 
Based on the user’s specifications of tolerable Pma, the corresponding Pfa is given by Stein’s 
Lemma. By means of the operating characteristic (OC) function, the warning threshold can be 
defined. The OC function represents the probability of acceptance of the null hypothesis which 
corresponds to the probability of no alarm activation. 
The ideal test corresponds to the ideal OC function shown in Figure 4, which gives a 
probability of acceptance of 1 for  when IM a≤ ˆIM c a≤ ⋅  (in acceptance zone) and probability of 
acceptance of zero for  when IM a≤ ˆIM c a> ⋅  (in the rejection zone). Note that the probability of 
acceptance conditioned on the predictor, ˆIM , may be written as ˆ|P IM a IM⎡ ⎤≤⎣ ⎦ , that corresponds 
to Pfa in the rejection (critical) zone and (1- Pma) in the acceptance zone. 
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1
ˆ|P IM a IM⎡ ⎤≤⎣ ⎦
 
Figure 4. The ideal OC function 
 
Based on uncertainties in the prediction of IM by ˆIM , which is based on the first seconds of 
observation of the seismic data, we cannot obtain an ideal OC function and we have to accept errors 
of type I and II (missed and false alarms). If the tolerable probability of a missed alarm in the 
acceptance zone is α and the tolerable probability of false alarm is β in the rejection zone, then the 
OC function will be characterized as in Figure 5 where β (or α) is the design requirement specified 
by the user and  α (or β), respectively, is given by Stein’s Lemma. The test is better designed if the 
OC function corresponding to the test is closer to the optimal OC function represented in Figure 5. 
A prior definition of a possible set of thresholds, c a⋅ , can be defined and for each value of a 
the optimal OC function is defined. The discrete OC function representing the test may be evaluated 
at a finite number of points representative of the values of probabilities of wrong decisions for a 
range of values of  of interest. A best fitting curve can be constructed based on these points and 
the corresponding value of  c  will be the optimal warning threshold. 
c a⋅
a⋅
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ˆ|P IM a IM⎡ ⎤≤⎣ ⎦
 
Figure 5. The optimal OC function 
 
4.3. Threshold setting based on cost-benefit considerations 
Instead of directly specifying tolerable probabilities of wrong decisions to represent the 
design parameters for setting the threshold, it may be more natural to derive them by examining the 
consequences of wrong decisions using a cost-benefit analysis. In this case, the decision criterion 
may be taken to be the minimization of the expected consequences over the two possible actions of 
raising the alarm or doing nothing. A cost benefit analysis is based on the details shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Cost benefit analysis for threshold design 
Action Cost for case: IM<a Cost for case: IM>a 
Raise Alarm False alarm:  
Cfa 
Good Alarm:  
Cga 
No Alarm Good Missed Alarm:  
Cgm 
Missed Alarm:  
Cma 
 
 30  
 where: 
               0
1              1
ga eq save ma eq gm
ga fa gm ma
C C C C C C
P P P P
= − =
= − = −

       (39) 
Here, Ceq represents the expected costs due to the earthquake, Cfa is the cost of a false alarm and 
Csave is the expected savings as a consequence of the activation of the protective measure. If the 
alarm is raised, the expected cost is given by: 
[ ]
( ) (
cost | alarm
 1
fa fa ga ga
)fa fa eq save fa
E C P C P
C P C C P
= ⋅ + ⋅
= ⋅ + − ⋅ −       (40) 
On the other hand, if the alarm is not raised, the expected cost is given by: 
[ ]cost | no-alarm
 
gm gm ma ma
ma ma
E C P C P
C P
= ⋅ + ⋅
= ⋅        (41) 
The decision criterion for deciding between the options, raising the alarm or not, is 
represented by the minimum cost rule: Raise the alarm if and only if  
[ ] [ ]cost | no-alarm cost | alarmE E≥        (42) 
that is,  
 
( ) (1 )
            ( ) ( )
eq ma fa fa eq save fa
save fa eq fa eq save
C P C P C C P
C C C P C C
⋅ ≥ ⋅ + − ⋅ −
= + − ⋅ + −       (43) 
Since the probabilities of false and missed alarms, Pfa and Pma, are given by Eq. 27 and 37, 
respectively, and so may be evaluated as a function of the warning threshold parameter c, Eq. 43 
can be taken as an equality to select an appropriate value of c. The tolerable value of Pfa and Pma 
may then be determined from Eq. 27 and 37 for this value of c. 
The above approach assumes that σtot in Eq. 27 and 37 is time invariant so that the alarm 
threshold value  for c a⋅ ˆIM can be set prior to operation of the EWS, where the value of critical 
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threshold, a, is specified by the user. During a seismic event, however, more and more information 
becomes available to the EWS and so σtot will decrease with time. A refined analysis using a time-
dependent warning threshold, c(t)a, would then be more appropriate. Alternatively, the probability 
of false and missed alarms could be monitored as a function of time and then the alarm would be 
raised when the tolerable level of probability of Pfa(t) or Pma(t) is exceeded.  
In the next section, we consider a refined decision-making procedure that is appropriate 
during a seismic event and which takes into account that the quality of the IM prediction improves 
as more and more information is obtained by the EWS. It is shown in section 5.1 that in this case: 
Pfa(t) + Pma(t) =1, so Eq. 43 implies that the probability of a false alarm is tolerable if and only if: 
 ( ) savefa
fa sav
CP t
C C
β≤ = + e
)
         (44) 
Similarly, since the alarm is not raised if and only if: 
( ) (eq ma save fa eq fa eq saveC P C C C P C C⋅ < + − ⋅ + −       (45) 
it follows that the probability of a missed alarm is tolerable if and only if: 
 ( ) fama
fa save
C
P t
C C
α< = +          (46) 
 It is clear from Eq. 44 and 46 that in this case, where the decision criterion is based on a 
cost-benefit analysis, 1α β+ = , which directly exhibits the trade-off between the threshold 
probabilities that are tolerable for false and missed alarms. If the threshold β is reduced to make 
false alarms less likely, then the threshold α for missed alarms becomes correspondingly larger.  
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5. Decision making in EWS during a seismic event 
5.1. Real-time uncertainty analysis during an event 
During a seismic event, the probability of false and missed alarms will be updated with time 
as more stations are triggered by the seismic waves and more data comes in from those that have 
already been triggered. This increase in data available will produce a decrease with time in the 
uncertainty in the predicted earthquake location and magnitude. Therefore, the prediction of the 
intensity measure can be updated with time and the characterization of its uncertainty, σtot (t), will 
vary with time. As a consequence, it is important to update the probability of false and missed 
alarms as the seismic event evolves. 
Recall that the predicted intensity measure, ˆ ,IM  is estimated from the attenuation model 
based on the predictions of earthquake magnitude and location provided by EWS and so it can be 
updated as a function of time during the event. On the other hand, the actual intensity measure 
value, IM, that will occur at the site is unknown. The predicted and actual values of the intensity 
measure differ by εtot(t) as in Eq. 3: 
 ˆ ( ) ( )totIM IM t tε= +           (47) 
As shown in Figure 6, the total error εtot(t) is related to εM(t), εR(t) and εIM, which can be continually 
updated as additional information becomes available by using Bayesian updating, as in the Virtual 
Seismologist method (Cua and Heaton 2004). Given the predicted value of ˆIM at time t, the 
uncertainty in IM can be modeled by a Gaussian distribution with mean equal to the prediction 
ˆ ( )IM t   and standard deviation equal to σtot(t), which can be evaluated by an analysis of the 
uncertainty propagation of the error, as was done to derive Eq. 8.  
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Figure 6. Simulation of the EWS prediction process, during the seismic event. 
 
The potential probability of a false alarm is estimated as the probability of IM being less than the 
critical threshold, a, given the predicted value ˆ ( )IM t  (if the alarm is raised, it becomes an actual 
probability of false alarm): 
ˆ( ) P[ | ( )]faP t IM a IM t= ≤          (48) 
Since the uncertainty in IM is modeled as a Gaussian distribution with mean equal to the predicted 
ˆ ( )IM t  (if there is a known bias in the prediction, it should be added to this mean) and with standard 
deviation totσ (t), evaluated as a function of the updated uncertainties for the earthquake magnitude 
and location, it follows that: 
( ) ( )
2ˆ( ( ))
22
ˆ1 -( ) exp
( )2
a
fa
tottot
IM IM t
ttot
a IM tP t dIM
tt σ σσ π−∞
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫
( )= Φ ⎟     (49) 
where  is the standard Gaussian cumulative distribution function. The potential probability of a 
missed alarm is equal to the probability of IM being greater than the critical threshold (if the alarm 
is not raised, it becomes the probability of a missed alarm): 
Φ
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ˆ( ) P[ | ( )]maP t IM a IM t= >          (50) 
and 
 ( ) ( )
2ˆ( ( ))
22
ˆ1 -( ) exp 1
( )2ma tota tot t
IM IM t
tot
a IM tP t dIM
tt σ σσ π
∞ − −⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞= ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦∫
( )= − Φ ⎟    (51) 
Since the two conditions ( andIM a IM a≤ > ) are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the 
probabilities Pfa(t) and Pma(t) always sum to one. 
5.2. Decision making during the seismic event 
The potential probabilities of false and missed alarms in Eq. 49 and 51 provide fundamental 
guidelines for the user’s decision making during the seismic event, since they quantify the 
reliability of the information provided by the EWS. While the event is occurring, the decision to 
raise the alarm can be based on real-time monitoring of the probability of wrong decisions, focusing 
on the situation (false alarm or missed alarm) that the user is more concerned about. It will be 
demonstrated in this section that this can be done by monitoring whether the predicted intensity 
measure exceeds a time-varying warning threshold, c(t) a. 
The proposed procedure is as follows. Using Eq. 49 and 51, the value of the probabilities 
Pfa(t) and Pma(t) are evaluated as time goes by during an event and they are compared to the 
tolerable values, which may be established based on cost-benefit considerations (see the end of 
Section 4.3). The alarm is raised when either Pfa(t) or Pma(t) reaches its tolerable value, β and α, 
respectively, as shown in Figure 7. This assumes that the time available is sufficient for activation 
of the protective measures. If the time available reaches the minimum time necessary for activation 
of the protective measure, the alarm will be raised only if the probability of a wrong decision, 
evaluated at that time, can be accepted. 
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Figure 7. Decision making process based on probability of wrong decisions. 
 
For the case of a missed alarm, the condition Pma > α in Figure 7 and Eq. 51 give the time-varying 
expression for the warning threshold as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1ˆ( ) 1- totma matP t IM t a c t aa
σ αα
−⎡ ⎤Φ −> ⇔ > = ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
     (52) 
Therefore, the setting of the alarm based on the probability of a missed alarm becoming 
unacceptable occurs if ˆ ( ) ( )maIM t c t a> ⋅  where: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 totma tc t a
σ α−⋅Φ −= −         (53) 
The alarm is also set if the probability of a false alarm falls below the tolerable level β and 
based on Eq. 49: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1ˆ( ) 1- totfa fatP t IM t a c t aa
σ ββ
−⎡ ⎤Φ< ⇔ > = ⋅⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
     (54) 
that is, the alarm is set if ˆ ( ) ( )faIM t c t a> ⋅  where: 
( ) ( ) ( )11 totfa tc t a
σ β−⋅Φ= −          (55) 
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Notice that if β<1-α, then  and so the concern about missing an alarm will control the 
setting of the alarm; on the other hand, if β>1-α, then concern about causing a false alarm will 
control the setting of the alarm. Of course, making an alarm decision based on the exceedance of 
the predictor above the time-varying warning threshold is equivalent to monitoring the probability 
of Pfa(t) and Pma(t) and raising the alarm based on exceedance of the tolerable level β and α, 
respectively.  
( ) ( )ma fac t c t<
It was pointed out in Section 4.3 that when the tolerable probabilities β and α to use during 
operation are based on cost-benefit considerations, they are related by: 1β α= − . Therefore, since 
both the alarm probabilities and their tolerable values sum up to one, the alarm probabilities will 
reach their critical thresholds at the same time, so one can choose to monitor either Pfa(t) and Pma(t). 
Similarly, if the predictor ˆ ( )IM t  is monitored, the critical thresholds, , are equal 
and so are reached at the same time. 
( )  and ( )ma fac t a c t a
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6. Application of EWS 
6.1. Pre-installation analysis: Southern California 
We suppose the future realization of a seismic EWS for the protection of facilities in 
Southern California and examine the question of the feasibility of applications of interest to the 
potential end-user. In particular, we address the question: How would an EWS perform during 
earthquakes that might occur in the area, viewed in terms of false and missed alarms? We can 
quantify the effectiveness of the EWS application by providing to the end-user the probabilities of 
wrong decisions to see whether they are acceptable and we can also set the warning threshold in 
order to match the user’s requirements.  
To illustrate the process, we choose a hazard function appropriate for the Los Angeles area 
to evaluate the probabilities of wrong decisions as a function of the warning threshold c.a and 
demonstrate that it can be set based on the tolerable level of probabilities of wrong decisions that 
come from a cost-benefit analysis. We assume that the critical threshold, a, has been selected by the 
user based on the EWS application of interest. The Virtual Seismologist method (Cua and Heaton 
2004, Cua 2004) is chosen to give the earthquake predictive model (M1 in Figure 1) and the 
attenuation model (M2 in Figure 1) which in the VS method (Cua and Heaton 2002) is defined as: 
1 1log [ ( )] log[ ( )]IM PGA aM b R C M d R C M e ε= = − + − + + +  (56) 
where M is the magnitude; R1 depends on R which is the epicentral distance; C(M) is a correction 
factor depending on magnitude. The residual term ε is a zero mean error term representing the 
prediction uncertainty and e is a constant error which includes station corrections; the parameters a, 
b, d, e are defined by the model’s calibration by data fitting. The parameters a, b, d, e are estimated 
from data by Cua and Heaton for different soil types; for rock, they are:  a = 0.779, b = 2.55·10-3,    
d = 1.352, e = -0.645 and ε is Gaussian (0, 0.243), i.e. with zero mean and standard deviation 0.243.  
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The intensity measure IM is the peak ground acceleration (PGA) on a log10 scale. The 
chosen hazard function for the Los Angeles area is shown in Figure 8 and it represents the mean 
rate of exceedance versus PGA in g units. The hazard function is fitted, as described previously, by 
minimizing the relative entropy in order to estimate the coefficient k1 to describe the probability 
distribution for IM and a value of k1=1.06 is obtained. 
To simulate the behaviour of the EWS from IM to the predicted value, ˆIM , we need to 
know the total error associated with this process, as defined in the earlier uncertainty propagation 
analysis. It is assumed that the errors associated with the magnitude and location estimation and the 
attenuation model (Cua and Heaton, 2004) are described by: 
− εM : Gaussian (0, 0.5) 
− εR : ignored at this stage 
− εIM : Gaussian (0, 0.243) 
Therefore, the total error associated with the predicted ˆIM , as given by Eq. 8 and 9, is: 
− εtot : Gaussian (0, 0.44) 
The probabilities of false and missed alarms are evaluated based on Eq. 27 and 37 and are 
shown in Figures 9 and 10 as a function of the warning threshold factor c for different values of the 
critical threshold  a. Notice that for Pfa in the approximate range of 0.05 to 0.4, the choice of c is 
insensitive to a. If it is false alarms that the user is more concerned about, the warning threshold can 
be set so that the tolerable level of probability of a false alarm is not exceeded. For example, if this 
tolerable level is Pfa = 0.4, then the warning threshold ca will be set equal to 2.22, as shown in 
Figure 11. Based on this warning threshold, the probability of a missed alarm that has to be 
accepted can then be evaluated as Pma = 0.05, as shown in Figure 12 by the point on the curve 
corresponding to ca=2.22. 
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Figure 8. Fitting the hazard function for Los Angeles area with a power-law in PGA 
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Figure 9. Probability of false alarm as a function of warning threshold factor c for                                                   
different critical thresholds, a, expressed in g’s. 
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Figure 10. Probability of missed alarm as a function of warning threshold factor c for                                                   
different critical thresholds, a, expressed in g’s. 
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Figure 11. Probability of false alarm for a given critical threshold a’ as a function of the warning threshold.  
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 Figure 12. Probability of missed alarm for a given critical threshold a’ as a function of the warning threshold.  
  
6.2. Yorba Linda Earthquake: M=4.75 
On 3 September 2002, the Yorba Linda earthquake occurred in Orange County, California, 
with magnitude 4.75. The epicenter has been located at 33.91730 N and 117.77580 W with a depth of 
12.92 Km. The area of the main shock is densely instrumented and the first station that was 
triggered by the event was the Serrano station at 9.9 Km from the epicenter. To simulate how the 
decision process would operate during a seismic event, the Virtual Seismologist magnitude and 
location estimates are used (Cua and Heaton 2004, Cua 2004).  
The Virtual Seismologist method is based on continual Bayesian updating of the predictions 
of magnitude and location as an increasing amount of data arrives from newly triggered stations and 
from continued recording of data from the stations already triggered. Different prior information 
can be considered in the method, including the Gutenberg-Richter law for a prior probability 
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density (PDF) on magnitude, Voronoi cells to define the most likely locations, and recently 
observed seismicity to take into account any foreshocks that may have occurred in the area of 
interest in the 24 hours before the main shock. 
As the first station is triggered, the Voronoi cell related to this station gives an area of 
possible locations since the cell is defined as all epicentral points that would give an event that is 
first recorded at the station. As a consequence, it is possible to define the prior PDF of most likely 
locations; the successive P arrivals that trigger other stations then provide additional information for 
the Bayesian updating of the prediction of epicentral distance. The most likely predictions of 
magnitude and location are those that maximize the joint posterior PDF given by: 
( ), | data (data | , ) ( , )p M R p M R p M R∝ ⋅        (57) 
The predictions from the Virtual Seismologist method for the magnitude and epicentral 
distance are available at 5, 10, 15, 20 and 50 seconds after the first station was triggered by the 
Yorba Linda earthquake. The epicentral distance prediction is considered time invariant, but the 
magnitude uncertainty is assumed to decrease as 1/ N  where N is the number of stations 
contributing information (Cua and Heaton 2004). The updating of magnitude uncertainty is 
continued because the error associated with magnitude is more influential in the IM prediction 
process than the error associated with epicentral distance. 
Using the temporal sequence of updated magnitude and location predictions given by Cua 
and Heaton (2004) for the Yorba Linda earthquake, we estimate the peak ground acceleration in 
log10 scale based on their attenuation relationship. The total uncertainty is updated every second as a 
function of the magnitude uncertainty and attenuation model uncertainty using Eq. 8 (neglecting 
location uncertainty, as mentioned above, because it is not as influential as the other two sources of 
uncertainty). The potential probabilities of wrong decisions are then evaluated at each second from 
Eq. 49 and 51. The results as a function of time are presented in Figure 13, which shows the PGA 
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prediction ˆ ( )IM t  (most probable value of IM = log10PGA at time t), the standard deviation of the 
error associated with the magnitude estimate and the potential probabilities of wrong decisions that 
were evaluated assuming the critical threshold for PGA is a=0.025g (corresponding to a=1.4 in 
log10 scale in cm\s\s). 
These potential probabilities of wrong decisions may be used to make a decision during the 
event of whether to raise the alarm or do nothing, based on tolerable values of Pfa or Pma derived 
from a cost-benefit analysis. For example, Figure 14 shows the plot of Pfa as a function of time and 
at about 28 seconds after the first station is triggered by the event, the tolerable value, β = 0.4, is 
reached and so the alarm would have then been raised (assuming that the minimum warning time 
for activation of the protective measure had not been reached before then).  
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Figure 14. Yorba Linda 2002: Decision making based on tolerable probability of false alarm. 
 
Alternatively, the threshold level  in Eq. 55 can be determined and the alarm raised 
when 
( )fac t
ˆ ( )IM t  exceeds , which, of course, also occurs at about 28 seconds.  ( )fac t a
6.3. San Simeon Earthquake: M=6.5 
On 22 December 2003, the San Simeon earthquake occurred on the central coast of 
California, with magnitude 6.5. The epicenter is located in 35.7020 N and 121.080 W with a depth of 
7 Km. The first station triggered by the event is the closest station to the epicenter, which is at 
Parkfield, about 57 Km from the epicenter. Unfortunately, the area in which the earthquake 
occurred is not densely instrumented and so the available data were not as extensive as for the 2002 
Yorba Linda event described before. The predictions for magnitude and location are available from 
the Virtual Seismologist method (Cua and Heaton, 2004) at 3, 5.5, and 8 seconds after the first 
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station was triggered by the event. The epicentral distance variable is considered as time invariant at 
57 Km based on the distance estimate from the first triggered station at Parkfield. 
From Eq. 49 and 51, the potential probabilities of wrong decisions are evaluated and used as 
a tool for decision making during the event, assuming a=0.025g (1.4 in log10 scale in cm\s\s). The 
results are shown in Figures 15 and 16. Figure 16 shows that the alarm would have been raised 
about 6.3 seconds after the first station was triggered.  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9t(s)
Pfa Pmaσtot
 
ˆIM
Figure 15. San Simeon 2003: Evolution of the prediction of IM, the standard deviation of magnitude prediction    
and the probabilities of wrong decisions (false and missed alarms) with time. 
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Figure 16. San Simeon 2003: Decision making based on tolerable probability of false alarm. 
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7. Concluding Remarks 
This report presents a probabilistic methodology for EWS analysis and design to take into 
account the inherent uncertainties in making decisions based on predictions from limited seismic 
sensor data. The methodology provides a probabilistic description of the anticipated system 
performance (in terms of the probability of making wrong decisions) in a pre-installation feasibility 
assessment of an EWS. An example is shown for Southern California. 
The performance of an EWS when operating in real-time is also explored and a         
methodology for deciding whether to raise the alarm or not is presented based on the probability of 
making wrong decisions. The methodology has been applied retro-actively to the Yorba Linda and 
San Simeon seismic events as illustrative examples.  
The theory presented in this report using the ground motion intensity as the predictor could 
be readily extended to consider other quantities of interest that more closely represent the 
consequences of concern to the user, such as in terms of structural response (for example, interstory 
drift), non-structural and structural damage, safety or economic losses. These consequences can be 
predicted based on facility-specific loss estimation methods, such as the performance-based 
earthquake engineering (PBEE) framework (Porter et al. 2002, Porter et al. 2004).  
The setting of the alarm during real-time operation of the EWS could then be based on 
monitoring the probabilities that specified engineering or economic parameters of interest would 
exceed their critical thresholds. The analysis is a natural extension of the previous theory; for 
example, to extend the probability of a missed alarm based on IM to that for an engineering demand 
parameter (EDP): 
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( ) ( )
-
ˆ( ) P[ | ( )]
ˆ= P | p | ( )
maP t EDP e IM t
EDP e IM IM IM t dIM
∞
∞
= >
>∫       (58) 
where e is the critical threshold value of the EDP, ˆp( | ( )),IM IM t  is a Gaussian PDF as before (see 
the integrand in Eq. 49) and   comes from a seismic vulnerability analysis for the 
facility (Porter et al. 2002, Porter et al. 2004). 
P( | )EDP e IM>
Similarly, the probability of a missed alarm can be extended to damage or loss estimation: 
( ) ( ) ( )
- 0
ˆ( ) P[ | ( )]
ˆ= P | p | p | ( )
maP t DV d IM t
DV d EDP EDP IM IM IM t dIMdEDP
∞ ∞
∞
= >
>∫ ∫    (59) 
where DV is a decision variable quantifying the damage or loss and d is the critical threshold value. 
There are many theoretical and practical issues related to EWS assessment and operation 
that remain to be addressed. For example, what are the best indicators of EWS performance? What 
is required to demonstrate that EWS offers new value to owners and facility stakeholders? What 
type of information would decision makers like to know in a pre-installation phase in order to 
evaluate the benefits of applying EWS for seismic risk protection?  
For further development of the methodology, it should be applied to real facilities where an 
EWS might produce the most value, such as applications to hospitals, schools, industrial plants, etc. 
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 8. Appendix 
8.1. Uncertainty propagation using Monte-Carlo simulation 
In this section the goal is to test the analytical expression of the prediction error Eq. (8) 
shown in Section 2.3 by a Monte-Carlo simulation method and to lay out an alternative approach to 
uncertainty propagation when Eq. (8) is not applicable. 
The prediction error, εtot, is calculated by propagating the single errors εM, εR and εΙM 
through the output. The intensity measure represents the output of the prediction process provided 
by EWS as a function of magnitude and epicentral distance. 
Magnitude and location in the uncertainty propagation process will be affected by errors, as 
shown in Figure 2 and which are modeled as described in the Section 2.2. Magnitude and source-to-
site distance are described by a prior distribution representing the most likely values, for a given site 
of interest. The seismic rate is assumed to follow the Gutenberg-Richter law (1997): 
( ) bMaMN −=10log  (60)
or, 
( ) bMaMN −⋅= 1010  (61)
 
The value of b varies somewhat from area to area, but worldwide it seems to be around b=1. 
This value is assumed for b in this work, while a=6 is taken as representative of Sothern California, 
as confirmed by Cua and Heaton (2002). An interval of interest of magnitude values is defined for a 
better representation of the area seismicity, i.e. [Mmin, Mmax]. The probability distribution is 
normalized based on the interval of interest, imposing the condition that the integral of the 
distribution represented by Eq.(67) is equal to unity, so: 
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ˆ
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−⎡ ⎤≥ ∈ = ∈⎣ ⎦ − ]   (62) 
The normalized distribution function provides the cumulative distribution function from 
which randomly picked magnitude values may be choosen during Monte Carlo simulation: 
 [ ] ( ) ( )maxminmin
ˆ
ˆmin
min max
1ˆ ˆ( ) | , ( ) 10 10
10 10
M
M
MM
M
P M P M M M M M p M dM −−−⎡ ⎤∆ ≤ ∈ = = −⎣ ⎦ −∫ M−  (63) 
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Figure 17. Probability distribution function p(M) and cumulative distribution function P(M) of magnitude, M. 
 
Epicentral distance values are choosen based on a prior probability distribution function 
representing the most likely locations. One possibility for the epicentral distance distribution is 
based on considering the distribution of source locations to be equally likely in an circular area of 
radius Rmax around the location of interest, so that: 
( ) 2
max
2
R
RRp =            (64) 
From the distribution of equally likely locations, the cumulative distribution for epicentral distances 
is derived, which can be used to randomly pick the values of epicentral distances during Monte 
Carlo simulation: 
ˆ 2
max 2
max max0
2ˆ ˆ( ) |
R
2
R RP R P R R R R dR
R R
⎡ ⎤∆ ≤ ≤ = =⎣ ⎦ ∫       (65) 
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In the Monte-Carlo analysis, values of magnitude and locations representing the actual 
values M and R are randomly picked from the corresponding cumulative distribution functions. 
Considering that EWS estimates of magnitude and distance, ˆ and ˆM R , are affected by 
errors, the predictions are created by adding the related errors to the real values of M and R. 
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Rmax
P(R)
Rmax R
1
R  
Figure 18. Probability distribution function p(R) and cumulative distribution function P(R) of epicentral distance, R 
assuming locations equally likely in an area of radius Rmax around the site of interest. 
The errors of magnitude and epicentral distance estimates are obtained by randomly picking 
values from the distributions of errors and  M Rε ε . The estimates of magnitude and epicentral 
distance are therefore: 
MMM ε+=ˆ  (66)
RRR ε+=ˆ  (67)
 
As noted previously, the prediction errors, εM, εR and εΙM, are modeled as Gaussian distributions 
(choosing logeR as basic Gaussian variable). 
The predicted intensity measure MI ˆ is estimated from the ground motion attenuation model, 
as a function of the simulated Mˆ  and Rˆ . The error related to the attenuation model is considered 
for each Monte-Carlo cycle by randomly choosing a value from a Gaussian distribution with zero 
mean and a standard deviation dependent on the attenuation model used. As a result, MI ˆ  is a 
function of the values M, R and the uncertainties εM,  εR and εΙM:  
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 ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )IM M RIM f M R f M R IMε ε ε ε= + = + + +  (68)
 
where the function f represents the attenuation model. The actual intensity measure, IM, is: 
  
),( RMfIM =  (69)
 
IM is evaluated for each value of magnitude and location, M and R, extracted from the cumulative 
distributions during the Monte-Carlo simulation. The prediction error associated with the ground 
motion parameter is given by the difference between the predicted intensity measure and the actual 
value. 
The process for uncertainty propagation by Monte-Carlo simulation is shown in Figure 19. 
The results, εtot, obtained from the Monte-Carlo simulations are then plotted as a histogram and 
fitted with a Gaussian distribution, as shown in Figure 20. The case considered is where the error εM 
associated with the magnitude prediction is modeled as a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and 
0.5 standard deviation, and the error εIM related to the attenuation model is modeled as a Gaussian 
distribution with zero mean and 0.3 standard deviation (Cua and Heaton, 2004). The total error 
follows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and standard deviation equal to 0.44 (Figure 20), 
which is consistent with the considerations in Eq. (8). 
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